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NOTES
THE DEBTORS RELIEF AFTER SALE UNDER A DEED OF TRUST
I
In Missouri, a mortgagee of real property has several statutory
remedies by which he may foreclose on the land which is security
for the debt or obligation. Under Section 3447,1 he may file a
petition in the circuit court when the amount of his debt exceeds
fifty dollars, setting forth in his petition the mortgage debt, re-
questing judgment for the debt, and that the mortgagor's equity
of redemption be foreclosed, and the mortgaged premises sold.
On the other hand, where the "mortagee" is the beneficiary un-
der a trust deed with power of sale, judicial proceedings are not
necessary; however, where the mortgagee proceeds under the
latter method and the sale is made by the trustee, some relief is
given to the grantor by allowing him to redeem from such sale
where the purchaser is the beneficiary of the trust.2 It is a pur-
pose of this article to analyze this latter procedure with the ob-
ject of marking the limits of this statutory right to redeem, the
duties of the grantor, and his successors, through a summary of
the decisions which have interpreted this statutory relief. In
addition, the article treats on the application of equitable princi-
ples where the statutory requirements are not followed in the
sale of mortgaged premises.
It is important to note that the statutory right to redeem is
not exclusive, and the passage of the statute does not prevent a
court of equity from exercising its inherent power to allow a
mortgagor to redeem where the equities are in his favor.3 The
court in the Schaeffer case allowed the grantor under a deed of
trust to redeem the property sold without compliance to the
statute. Here, the grantor tendered interest after default but
before advertisement of sale by the trustee. The grantor's tender
was refused. After the sale, the grantor brought his action to
redeem and was willing to pay any sum the court would decree
due the purchaser at the sale. The court inferred that in a
proper case laches may well bar the equitable relief even though
1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 3447 (1939).
2. Mo R v. STAT. § 3450 (1939).
3. Potter v. Schaeffer, 209 Mo. 586, 108 S.W. 60 (1908); Hoffman v.
Bingham et al., 324 Mo. 516, 24 S.W.2d 125 (1930); Stephenson v. Kilpat-
rick, 166 Mo. 262, 65 S.W. 773 (1901).
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the statutory period had not expired. The doctrine of laches was
not applied as the defendant in taking possession was well aware
of the grantor's rights by making a tender. Certainly, a correct
result was reached in allowing equitable redemption, for the
terms of the deed provided that the default in an interest pay-
ment would allow the trustee to exercise the power of sale. This
is especially harsh when it was shown that the purchase price
on the sale was far less than the grantor's equity in the property.
As shown in the Schaeffer case, an equitable right to redeem will
be allowed only where there is an irregularity in the sale by non-
compliance with the statutory requirements surrounding such
sale, or that something in the nature of fraud or "imposition"
has been practiced on the grantor.
Mere purchase of the land at less than its true value is not, in
and of itself,* within the purview of what equity would deem
fraudulent." It is to be noted, however, that in the Roby case, the
cestui que trust under the deed of trust was not the purchaser
at the sale. An additional fact supporting the equities of the
purchaser was the giving up of possession by one of the grantor's
heirs after the sale; thus, leading the purchaser to believe that
the sale and the trust deed would not be contested. This fact,
alone, should not control, but when it is considered that the suit
was not started until twenty-three months after the sale, the
purchaser's right should not be disturbed by allowing a redemp-
tion. While a purchaser cannot improve the premises to a point
which would prevent redemption, the improvements made by
this purchaser were proved to have been made in reliance upon
the grantor's heirs' apparent abandonment of any desire to effect
a future redemption.
An excellent example of the type of fraud or sharp practices in
a sale which equity will set aside and from which the grantor will
be allowed to redeem can be noted in Alfred v. Pleasant.5 In this
case, the beneficiary of the deed of trust lulled the grantor byadvising him that only the interest payments need be made on
due date, and "not to be concerned about the principal." The
grantor was an enfeebled old man who greatly relied on a son.
During the son's absence, and without notice to the grantor, the
4. Roby et aL v. Smith, et al., 261 Mo. 192, 168 S.W. 956 (1914); Keith
et al. v. Browning, 139 Mo. 190, 40 S.W. 764 (1897).
5. 175 S.W. 891 (Mo. 1915).
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sale was made, and the beneficiary purchased the premises. The
son returned immediately after the sale and tendered payment
of the indebtedness and the costs of the sale. The tender was
refused. The court would not allow the beneficiary-purchaser's
action of ejectment, contending that equity would protect the
grantor from the deception which prevented him from exercising
the opportunity of complying with the statutory right to redeem.
It is interesting to note that the tender and willingness to pay
was successfully used as a defense in an action of ejectment.
As previously inferred, a court of equity will require that a
person bring his action within a certain period, or be barred by
his laches. In the case of Gray v. Howard,6 an attempt was made
to redeem seven years after the sale under the deed of trust, and
the defendant, the cestui que trust, was purchaser. The plain-
tiffs, judgment creditors of the grantor and who had purchased
the land from the sheriff who levied execution on their judgments,
were denied the right to redeem. It would seem that the court
took into consideration that the complaining party was not the
original grantor, and that these creditors had waited seven years
before attempting to secure any satisfaction on their judgments.
In another situation, however, equity allowed redemption when
proceedings were brought thirteen months after the irregular
sale under the deed of trust, and where nothing was shown that
the party intended to abandon the equity of redemption.7 In
Ferguson v. Soden,8 a delay of eight years prevented the grantor
from redeeming as there were no apparent defects in the deed of
trust, or the trust deed given the purchaser. This case, however,
is not proper authority as to when laches may bar the equitable
proceeding, as there was no defect in the circumstances sur-
rounding the sale, and as a result, no reason to consider whether
equitable principles would apply. Redemption was refused
within three years after the sale in Klein v. Vogel.9 There, the
one seeking to redeem had purchased the grantor's equity of
redemption prior to default. The defendant was a subsequent
holder of the note which was secured by the lands to be redeemed.
The trustee's sale was made after due notice to the petitioner,
and the defendant purchased the property at the sale. The plain-
6. 14 Mo. 341 (1851).
7. Hoffman v. Bingham et al., 324 Mo. 516, 24 S.W.2d 125 (1930).
8. III Mo. 208, 195 S.W. 727 (1892).
9. 90 Mo. 239, 1 S.W. 733 (1886).
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tiff's position in equity was unfavorably affected, for it was
shown that he refused, after filing suit, the defendant's offer to
convey the premises if the plaintiff would pay the debt, interest,
taxes, and costs of repairs made while the defendant was in
possession. It may well be that if these additional facts were not
involved in the case, the court would allow such a suit initiated
three years after sale.
While it has been pointed out that a court of equity may allow
redemption from an irregular sale, they will accept the terms
of a separate agreement between the grantor and the holder of
the debt, whereby the creditor agrees to purchase the property at
the trustee's sale and hold it subject to the grantor's (or his
grantee's) rights without requiring statutory compliance by the
grantor. In McNew v. Booti,1o the grantor of a deed of trust was
seeking to redeem three years after the sale. Prior to the sale,
the holder of the obligation secured by the deed of trust agreed
to purchase the property on the sale and to hold it a reasonable
time for the grantor's benefit. There was no evidence of any
fraud practiced on the grantor. Two years after the sale, the
defendant refused a tender from the grantor of the proper sums.
The court held that a "reasonable" time had elapsed and that
the grantor's interests were completely barred. A clear case of
the courts' respect of a separate agreement to hold for the
grantor, after a purchase at the trustee's sale, can be seen in
Kennedy v. Siemers.1 Here, .again, there was an agreement to
purchase at the trustee's sale, take a trust deed in his own name
and to convey the land back to the grantor if the grantor repaid
advancements within two years from the date of sale. It was
held that the grantor and those taking under him with knowledge
of the contract were estopped to redeem from the sale which was
invalid for failure of proper notice by the trustee-the contract
fixed the rights of the parties. In Sturgeon v. Mudd,2 the bene-
ficiary agreed, after default, to forego forcing the sale of the
property under the deed of trust, provided the grantor made
certain payments. Instead, the sale was carried out, and the
beneficiary purchased at the sale. This would appear to be a
proper place for equity to allow the grantor to redeem. The oppo-
10. 42 Mo. 189 (1868).
11. 120 Mo. 73, 25 S.W. 512 (1894).
12. 190 Mo. 200, 88 S.W. 630 (1905).
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site result was reached, however, apparently on the clean hands
doctrine, when the grantor sought equitable relief. When the
grantor had secured additional time from the holder of the debt,
he, the grantor, was aware that there was a deed of trust prior
to the defendant's deed outstanding against the property, and
the existence of liens by virtue of judgments. Although knowing
these facts, the grantor did not reveal them. The court came to
the right result in finding that the defendant acted properly in
his refusal to perform the extension agreement when learning
that the property was encumbered by liens with priority over
his deed of trust.
It may be said after a reviewal of these previously cited cases
that for one seeking to redeem on equitable principles, irregular-
ity in the trustee's sale must be shown, or that something in the
nature of fraud has been practiced on the grantor. This latter
condition may or may not be exposed by comparing the market
value of the property and the selling price.
II
As explained in the foregoing section, the statutory right to
redeem is not the grantor's sole remedy and the equitable relief
remains. But inasmuch as equitable relief is discretionary would
it not be better that the grantor seek to protect his equity in the
property which is subject to a deed of trust by complying with
the statute where he has the opportunity to do so? This would
be true even though the provisions of the statute may change,
and thus require a periodic review and advice as to the method
which would be adopted to protect the debtor's equity. The
principle of the statutory right to redeem has not changed-
merely the time requirements and procedural steps which are to
be observed.
The condition with which the one seeking to redeem must com-
ply-and this includes the grantor's heirs, devisees, executors,
administrators, grantees, or assigns-are as strictly enforced
as the provisions which must be met in effectuating a valid sale.
Section 34501s requires:
... that such persons entitled to redeem shall give written
notice at the sale or within ten (10) days before the sale to
the person making or who is to make the sale of the purpose
13. Mo. REv. STAT. § 3450 (1939).
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to redeem if the sale and purchase are so made; and pro-
vided further, that said grantor.., to make said redemp-
tion shall within said year pay the debt and interest and
other obligations... together with all sums paid out by the
holder thereof ... for the interest and principal and either
of any prior encumbrances, and for taxes and assessments
and all legal charges and costs of the sale.
This section cannot be invoked unless the grantor also complies
with Section 3451," which provides that no party has the right
to redeem unless within twenty days from the date of sale
proper security is given in the circuit court of the county in
which the land is located. The security is in the nature of a
bond which is to have proper surety and is to be sufficient to
secure interest to accrue during the year on the mortgage debt,
the legal costs and expenses of the sale, interest which accrued
prior to sale on any encumbrance which the purchaser had to
pay, interest on sums paid by the purchaser at sale, and for
damages for waste during the year. A motion for approval shall
accompany such bond. If the court is not in session when bond
is filed for approval, temporary approval may be given by the
clerk, subject to review, later, by the judge of the circuit court.
Without this approval or presentment to the court or judge,
within twenty days after filing, the bond is deemed disapproved,
Where proper bond is given and approved by the circuit court,
the trustee at the purchaser's request shall execute to him a
certificate of sale. If redemption is not made within one year,
then the purchaser is to receive a trust deed.
Having outlined the terms of the statute and the time periods
in which the grantor, or those claiming under him, must act, a
question arises as to whether "time is of the essence," or will the
court excuse performance when the grantor proceeds to invoke
the statutory right to redeem.,In Godfrey v. Stocke,'. the grantor
on the day of sale told the trustee and holder of the debt that
he would redeem. Two days later, he filed leave to give security
and for redemption. The bond which he gave was approved
fifteen days later, and ten months after sale, the grantor offered
to redeem the holder of the debt who purchased the premises and
was then in possession. The statute required bond to be furnished
at date of sale. The grantor was allowed to redeem within the
14. Mo. R V. STAT. § 3451 (1939).
15. 116 Mo. 403, 25 S.W. 733 (1893).
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twelve months period with the court concluding that the statu-
tory requirement of furnishing bond on the day of sale was too
arbitrary and unreasonable as the grantor may not know who is
purchasing the property. Also, surety may be difficult to obtain,
and even if obtained, the place of sale may be some distance from
the clerk's office with the result that it may be impossible to have
the bond approved. In this instance, the court felt that a reason-
able time should be the guide and filing two days after sale met
the test of reasonableness. The Godfrey case would seem to be
no longer authority as the statute now requires the bond to be
filed within twenty days after the date of sale. It is clear
that the additional days of grace through legislative enactment
have caused the extinguishment of the "reasonable time" rule in
one small area of the law. In several instances, by sustain-
ing a writ of prohibition, it has been held the provisions of the
statute are mandatory. 16 In State ex rel. H.O.L.C., a writ of
prohibition was sought to prevent continued action by a circuit
judge before whom a motion to redeem was pending. The gran-
tor had given notice of intent to redeem on the morning of the
sale, and within the twenty day period filed a bond accompanied
by a motion for its approval. This bond was rejected and the
application to redeem denied. After expiration of the twenty
day period, the petitioner was allowed to strike his former surety,
and "refile" a bond which the court approved. The writ was
sustained on the grounds that the circuit court had no jurisdic-
tion because of the failure to comply strictly with the statute.
In the Leehorn case, it was affirmatively stated that filing the
bond within twenty days is a condition necessary for jurisdiction.
Certainly, the result in the Home Owners Loan Corporation case
was harsh, but not as severe as that which resulted in Dawson V.
Hetzler.Y1 Here, the petitioner purchased the grantor's equity
of redemption three days before the sale under the deed of trust.
He failed to give notice to the trustee or the holder of the debt
that he intended to redeem until several hours after the sale.
16. State ex rel. Home Owners Loan Corp. v. Bird, 232 Mo. App. 652, 110
S.W.2d 386 (1937); State ex tel. Hanks v. Leehorn, 227 Mo. App. 666, 55
S.W.2d 714 (1932), surety's act was ultra vires and proper bond not filed
within twenty days from date of sale. Held: filing proper bond necessary
before hearing motion to approve the bond.
17. 230 Mo. App. 737, 74 S.W.2d 488 (1934), mandatory-where wife
joined in deed of trust, and after divorce seeks to establish marital rights in
premises. Moss v. Brant et at., 216 Mo. 641, 116 S.W. 503 (1909).
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Then, and within the twenty day period, he filed his redemption
bond. For failure to give notice "at, or prior to the sale" the
petitioner was defeated; once again the mandatory character of
the statutory requirements was brought into focus.
In addition, -where one is petitioning to redeem, the bond must
accompany the petition and both be filed within the twenty day
period. This requirement is not met by petitioning for leave to
file a bond.' It has been held that a bill to redeem from a sale
under a deed of trust not fied within twelve months after sale,
and which fails to allege that the plaintiff gave or attempted to
give the security required, is fatally defective. 19 Note, however,
if the petitioner includes sufficient allegations which may en-
title him to equitable relief through redemption, the fatal char-
acter of the petition would be corrected.
A question has arisen as to the interest which the grantor
acquires when he redeems the property, either under the statute
or by equitable relief. It has been held that the grantor does not
receive a new title but is merely restored to his old title free and
clear of the lien which was foreclosed, subject to all other liens.20
This is true even though a trustee's sale is wrongfully executed,
for until the sale is set aside there is a legal transfer of title.2'1
* ALLEN S. BARTON, JR.
18. Walmsey et al. v. Daugherty et at., 163 Mo. 298, 63 S.W. 693 (1901).
19. Sturgeon v. Mudd, 190 Mo. 200, 88 S.W. 630 (1905).
20. Greene v. Spitzer et al., 343 Mo. 151, 123 S.W.2d 57 (1938).
21. Loeb v. Dowling et al., 349 Mo. 674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942).
* Attorney, St. Louis, Mo.
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